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Abstract
The dispersal of anthrax spores in October, 2001 showed Americans that they are vulnerable to bioterrorism. The ineffective
response to bioterrorism demonstrates that public health agencies do not have plans or training exercises in place to deal with
this emerging threat. Although the CDC asked that the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA or Model Act) be
drafted to prepare the states for these emerging risks, critics like George Annas assert that the acts are “blatantly
unconstitutional” (MSEHPA,2005,p.1). In this paper, I intend to explore the conflict between individual rights and sweeping
powers of public health agencies as described by the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act.
Introduction
Americans, accustomed to personal security, are now
faced with a new reality that forces us to balance our rights
of liberty and individual autonomy with the threat of
terrorism.
The tragic events of September 11th and the threats of
biological terrorism that followed transformed the focus of
public health agencies back to prevention, detection,
management, and containment of new and emerging
health emergencies. In the aftermath of September 11th,
the reality of larger, more sophisticated attacks against the
US created a sense of vulnerability and the inherent need
to strengthen the health infrastructure of this country.
After these events unfolded, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) requested that the Model
State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA or Model
Act) be drafted to shore up the Public Health System in the
US in October 2001. The Act was intended to serve as a
guide to help states update their legal infrastructures to
prepare for and deal more effectively with acts of
bioterrorism.
In response to this request, the Center for Law and the
Public’s Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins
University collaborated with governors, state legislatures,
health officials, and attorney generals across the country to
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develop a comprehensive plan to respond to a national
emergency crisis.
Lawrence O. Gostin, law and public health professor at
Georgetown University, was a member of the planning
team for the Model Act. He asserts that in a bioterrorism
threat, our public health system should have sweeping
powers over the individual liberty of the citizens of the US.
“Gostin believes that the communitarian tradition of
American thought, rather than the individualistic strain,
must govern the appropriate balance between public health
and individual liberty” (Gostin, in Levine,2006,p.351).
The topics addressed in the Model State Emergency
Health Powers Act include:
·
·
·
·
·
·
·

Management of property
Data and record collections through surveillance
Communication to the public
Exchange of health information to prevent,
identify, and investigate public health issues
Control of health care suppliers
Tracking of prescription drugs, including
“unusual” trends
Protection of individuals regarding mandatory
examinations, vaccinations, and quarantine, and
isolation
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The Model Act also addresses the principles and
requirements necessary to protect and safeguard the
personal rights and property of citizens.
Because the power to act to preserve the public’s health is
constitutionally reserved primarily to the states as an
exercise of their police powers, the Model Act is designed
for state, not federal, legislative consideration. It provides
the responsible state actors with the powers they need to
detect and contain a potentially catastrophic disease
outbreak, and at the same time, protect individual rights
and freedoms (Gostin, et al ,2002,p.2).
The committee that drafted MSEHPA (2001) concluded
that this policy balanced the public health goals of
detection, management, and containment against the need
to safeguard the civil rights, liberties, and property of
American citizens. The first draft, intended to support the
functions of public health agencies, provided overwhelming
powers to state governments. This created much
opposition because the ability to mitigate a massive attack
was not addressed and therefore created concern for
governmental abuse of power.
Gostin, et al, contend the Model Act serves as a critical tool
for reform of the state public health laws and does serve its
intended purpose of balancing civil liberties and the public
good. It “provides a modern framework for effective
planning, prevention, identification, and response to
emerging health threats, while guarding against the
potential excesses of government power” (Gostin &
Hodge,2003, p.479). He further states that the final draft of
the Act creates a delicate balance between the philosophy
of public health issues and a rights-oriented perspective.
Although the act may not totally balance freedom with
public good, it does recognize the tradeoffs and seeks to
establish a fair resolution by defending personal and
collective interests.
In opposition, George Annas, a lawyer at Boston University
School of Public Health and leading critic of the MSEHPA,
published an article in JAMA stating the Act does “not
represent the official policy, endorsement, or views of
anyone, including the US Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), or any of the organizations listed in the
acknowledgements”(Annas,2002,p.1). He also stated that it
was intended simply as a “draft for discussion,” rather than
the actual emergency plan that should be implemented by
the US Public Health System.
In the JAMA article, Annas verbalized the following three
objections to the Model Act:
· Bioterrorism is primarily a federal issue, not a
state issue
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·

·

In a bioterrorist attack, Americans do not have to
trade their freedom for the sake of security; if
properly informed, physicians and the public will
cooperate and comply with public health
measures.
“The arbitrary use of force by public officials with
immunity from liability is incompatible with
medical ethics, constitutional principles, and
basic democratic values” (Annas,2002,p.2685).
Annas (2002) feels the law was “blatantly
unconstitutional”(MSEHPA,2005,p.1) and that it
is “unnecessary and counterproductive” (Annas
in Levine,2006,p.351) to sacrifice human rights
when responding to a bioterrorism attack.

Annas challenges Gostin, et al, regarding the implied
support of the Act and contends that every state except
Minnesota has rejected it or has made major modifications.
The state of Minnesota did, however, make provisions to
protect the fundamental right of its citizens to refuse
medical treatment, examinations, preventative programs,
and vaccinations (Annas,2002,p.2685).
Annas contends the MSEHPA is a seriously flawed and
inconsistent proposal that should be regularly discussed
and amended as better provisions are adopted or proposed
by the legislature.
Jane Orient M.D., editor of the Association of American
Physicians and Surgeons newsletter (AAPS News), also
published a response in JAMA in opposition to the
MSEHPA proposal written and advocated by Gostin, et al.
Orient asserts the Act would do nothing to improve
governmental mitigation in the event of a massive
bioterrorism attack. Although the original and revised
versions of the Act were revised in response to criticism,
she contends that state governments are given “unbridled
power to seize property, commandeer resources, and force
potentially misdirected treatment or quarantine on the
population” (Orient,2002,p.2686).
Further, the Act would give unlimited discretion and
enormous power to governors, allowing them the ability to
define the public health emergency and the response to it.
Orient contends the MSEHPA has the potential to create a
mechanism for massive governmental abuse and does
nothing to address or correct the pervasive
unpreparedness that currently exists in the public health
system.
Sue Blevins, President of the Institute for Health Freedom,
also responded unfavorably to MSEHPA and cites the
following objections to the proposal.
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The initial proposal, drafted on October 23, 2001, “will
impact our individual freedoms and civil liberties for years
to come. Such legislation could affect citizen’s individual
freedoms and property rights” (Blevins, 2002, p.1). She
contends that the model act contains coercive provisions;
that “we can and must find a better way to defend citizens
against bioterrorism while protecting our precious individual
freedoms” (Blevins,2002,p.4).
When the proposal was posted, several of these groups
listed issued strong denials of their participation and
collaboration in preparation of the proposed law. In
addition, it was disclosed that Gostin, et al, did not consult
with the public, public health officials, or constitutional law
experts when drafting this proposal.
The Association of American Physicians and Surgeons
claimed the law changed existing public health laws and
could allow governors to turn into dictators by empowering
them to violate fundamental rights and liberties. Phyllis
Schlafly described it as “an unprecedented assault”
(MSEHPA,2005,p.1) on the rights of American people.
Gostin countered by stating that “the threat of bioterrorism
makes it imperative to reframe the balance between
individual interests and society’s need to protect itself so
that the common good prevails” (Gostin in
Levine,2006,p.350).
In response to criticism, the proposal was rewritten by
Gostin,et al, and re-issued in December, 2001. The second
draft deleted “in collaboration” and changed the verbiage to
“assist” the various associations in a public health
emergency. In spite of these changes, Annas verbalized
that all the fundamental problems, core concerns, and
vague standards still remained, allowing for “arbitrary and
capricious decisions” which can undermine the public’s
trust in public health authorities (Annas,2002,2685).
Analysis
The events of September 11th underscored our
vulnerabilities and created a call to action for every citizen
in the United States. As citizens, it is our right and
responsibility to demand that our local, state, and federal
government provide the necessary security in our
communities by creating a stronger public health system
that can respond quickly and efficiently toan attack by
bioterrorists.
After 9/11, few disagreed that the states had a weak
foundation and framework for effective public health
response and action. In response, the Department of
Health and Human Services, the CDC, the Institute for
Medicine, and the Turning Point Public Health Statute
Modernization Collaborative recommended improvement of
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inadequate existing public health laws (established early to
mid-20th century) citing the following reasons:
·
·
·
·

Antiquated current laws predate modern health
practice and science
Inconsistencies within the states and
inconsistencies regarding treatment of similar
conditions (STDs and HIV/AIDS)
Inadequate planning, communication, and
coordination among responsible agencies
Ineffective chain of command established for
detection and response

Amid much controversy following the final release of the
MSEHPA in December 2001,Gostin and Hodge (2002)
reflected in an article in Public Health Reports that: The
Model Act rectifies these and other deficiencies in existing
public health emergency laws. The Act reflects modern
constitutional standards for protection of liberty and
property interests. MSEHPA authorizes government to
prevent and ameliorate a bioterrorism event or other public
health emergencies (p.477).
According to Blevins (2002), great concerns arose when
the MSEHPA provided governors and public health officials
with unprecedented powers once a public health
emergency was declared:
·
·
·
·
·
·

To force individuals to undergo examinations if
suspected of harboring “infectious disease”
To require examination and treatment, even if
against one’s will; imprisonment for those who
refuse
To require individuals to be vaccinated, treated,
or quarantined for infectious diseases
To seize, without compensation, private property,
foods, medicine
To control health care facilities and
communication devices
To impose fines and penalties in order to enforce
commands

The attacks on our homeland clearly demonstrated the
need for public health agencies to focus more on public
interest than the individual rights we have become
accustomed to over the previous 200 years. Traditionally,
Americans have focused disproportionately on individual
rights over the common good of society.
In order to reach a proper balance in the public health
system, there is a continuous need to strengthen security,
assess public safety, and review public health policies.
Public health agencies require a strong infrastructure to
meet and conduct essential public health services at the
3

highest level of performance in order to match and exceed
the constantly evolving threats that face our nation. Laws
are necessary to protect public health.
Repair of the nation’s public health system can only be
accomplished with political will and economic resources. “A
constitutional democracy must balance the common good
with respect for personal dignity, toleration of groups, and
adherence to principles of justice” (Gostin, et
al.,2002,p.10).
Conclusion
In order to test government response and raise public
awareness of bioterrorism, the government simulated two
biological attacks called Dark Winter (2000) and TOPOFF
(2001). Both simulations revealed serious weaknesses in
the public health system’s response to bioterrorism and
naturally occurring infectious diseases. These simulations
showed that there was a lack of information systems to
provide rapid dissemination of medical information;
inadequate supplies of vaccines and preventative drugs;
unpreparedness for mass casualty response; and a need
to federalize the National Guard to maintain order.
Although both of these simulations occurred several years
ago (2000,2001), we still remain highly vulnerable and
under-prepared. A seamless public health agency
response still does not exist between federal, state, and
local health systems.
Even though there have been other simulations since
2001, public health response to Hurricane Katrina
confirmed major flaws in government agencies. The
response to Katrina demonstrated a catastrophic failure in
coordinating, communication, and management efforts.
The failure was at all levels of government. In the first 72
hours there appeared to be no immediate action, creating a
tremendous loss of confidence in the ability of our public
health agencies to respond to a disaster.
Under our federalist system of government, states and
localities possess public health power. Annas (2001)
believes that our state laws are antiquated and that
“bioterrorism should move us toward a more federalized
and globalized public health system” (Annas in
Levine,2006,p.358). Since bioterrorism is a matter of
national security, it becomes a federal concern requiring
specially adapted defenses.
The Model Act clearly delegates empirical powers to the
governors. Although public health officials should exercise
limited power over physicians and healthcare providers, the
system would work more effectively and efficiently if public
health officials worked together with physicians and public
authorities.
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At the 2003 National Congress on Public Health readiness,
Dr. Julie Geberding, Director of the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention, stressed the importance of a
partnership between the public health and the healthcare
delivery systems. She discussed the public health agency’s
responsibilities of planning, surveillance, communication,
education, and training of the public health workforce.
Preparation and response to bioterrorism requires a
collaborative team approach at every level of the
government.
Should public health agencies have sweeping powers over
individual liberty during the threat of bioterrorism? Not if
that means a delay in action by physicians and healthcare
delivery systems. The lack of a speedy and effective
response after Hurricane Katrina showed that the
government does not have the ability to coordinate efforts
by using the Model Act’s paradigm of “sweeping powers.”
If the government cannot respond in four days to an event
that could be anticipated, how can they handle
bioterrorism? The hurricane was a “well modeled situation”
and there is little wonder how the public health system
would respond and coordinate efforts to a biological event.
Perhaps the best way to handle future catastrophic events
would be to assign control to the highest ranking stateside
military general. He or she could assume the leadership
role and direct the operations of FEMA, Homeland
Security, and the Public Health System and coordinate all
operations within the disaster area with local healthcare
providers.
In fact, this happened when Vice Admiral Thad Allen, Chief
of Staff, U.S. Coast Guard, was finally brought in to
command the operations in New Orleans. His immediate
focus was response, coordination of rescue efforts, and
communication. His experience, insight, and expertise
were apparent immediately, and for the first time since
Katrina hit, people felt a sense of security and confidence.
In summary, improvements of the public health system are
needed to respond and react to the threat of bioterrorism.
Communication is critical. There must be a state-of-the-art
computerized communication system that will link local,
state, and federal public officials, healthcare facilities, and
providers to allow for the sharing of information.
When the public health system achieves this level of
expertise, organization, and preparedness, people may be
more willing to relinquish their personal autonomy and
individual liberties for the good of the public health.
In closing, a quote from Senator Bill Frist, MD.,
summarizes our future challenges:
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Our benchmark will be the changes we
incorporate to ensure that each day, we are more
able to respond because we have thought about
our vulnerabilities, assessed appropriate actions,
and taken steps to ensure that the next biological

attack will be met with the full force of a
coordinated, well-developed, expertly trained
disaster response team (Frist,2002,p.171).
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